This review of adjustment experience suggests that sharp devaluation of the exchange rate is probably ineffective in countries exporting primary goods. To encourage investment, adjustment packages must do more to ensure a stable macroeconomic environment and appropriate debt relief.
At the center of the controversy about the
The longer-term prospects for exporters of effectiveness of "adjustment with growth" loan manufactured goods are much brighter. They packages from the IMF and the World Bank has show more signs of improving efliciency and becn the heavy emphasis on real exchangc rate less decline in investment than do exporters of depreciation as a way to rcstore extcnial balance primary goods. and eli,it a positive supply response.
Faini and de Melo found strong support for Faini and de Melo examined the adjustment the debt overhang argument. That is, after record for a large sample of developing countries controlling for other factors, they found that the and found that adjustment has been far more resumption of private investment growth had successful for countries exporting manufactured been hampered in countries with a heavy debt goods than for countries exporting primary burden and an unstablc macroeconomic cnvirongoods (mostly low-income African countrics).
ment. Investors postpone investment until the uncertainty about a stabilization program is Devaluation of the exchange rate in counresolved -and low investment, in turn, intries exporting primary goods appears to be creases the probability of economic detcrioraineffective. Most of their adjustment has taken tion. This suggests that adjustment packages the form of reduced spending rather than inmust do more to ensure a stable macrocconomic crcased supply. As a result, they have not environment and appropriate debt relief. resumed sustainablc growth.
Introduction
The developing countries have been in crisis since 1982. By then, the combination of deteriorating terms of trade, rising real interest rates on their external debt and the drying up of commercial lending forced them to pursue drastic economic adjustment policies.
Faced with a sharp withdrawal of commercial bank funds that was only partly compensated by official lending, and unwilling to default, developing countries had to effect a positive transfer to developed countries. The crisis required a sharp adjustment: developing countries would have to earn foreign exchange by exporting more or save it by importing less. It is now recognized that the brunt of adjustment fell on absorption, in particular on investment.
In most developing countries, with the significant exception of Southeast Asian countries, adjustment was achieved by cutting investment rather than by increasing saving. Both public and private investment fell.
Admittedly, prior to 1982 many countries had embarked on overly ambitious investment programs, partly because recycled petro-dollars were all too readily available. Yet the fall in investment, particularly private investment, could have adverse implications for a sustained recovery.
In response to the debt crisis, the IMF increased its lending, and the World Bank responded by introducing quick-disbursing adjustment loans to help countries achieve both macroeconomic equilibrium and an efficient structural adjustment. In many quarters, the crisis was viewed as an opportunity to carry out much needed microeconomic reforms that would raise efficiency and allow adjustment to take place without a loss in growth despite the loss in investment.
Whatever the differences in the depth of the crises affectinp them, most developing countries have been undergoing structural adjustment for almost a decade now. What can be said overall about the success of adjustment since the crisis?
In this paper, we evaluate adjustment packages by focusing on two key issues: did the sharp devaluation of the real exchange rate (advocated by international organizations) generate a supply response, and did microeconomic rationalization sufficiently raise the marginal efficiency of investment to compensate for the adverse effects of adjustment on the volume of investment? In other words, are there signs that the structural reforms are bearing fruit at least in the form of more efficient, if not higher growth, and, if there is recovery, is it sustainable?
Sustainability has assumed particular importance because the sharp drop in living standards that has accompanied adjustment programs in many countries has created tensions that affect investment decisions. Is the uncertainty preventing investment in countries that would otherwise attract investment precisely because of the lower real wages? If credibility is indeed low, that is, if investors are waiting to see whether economic conditions will deteriorate, then their expectations could become selffulfilling, and could lead to the abandonment of othe-wise well-conceived adjustment packages.
To set the tone for our analysis of these issues, we need first to get a general sense of how adjusting countries are doing. Just as the severity of the crises differed widely across countries, so too has the burden of adjustment and its timing, and no classification system for grouping countries can fully capture this diversitv. Table 1 summarizes the latest available figures. !lere we chose a country grouping based on Period Averages for 1978-81, 1982-86, and 1988-88 Debt/GDP (debt-service ratio in percent GDP growth Investment/GDP Real exchange rate / in parentheses) 1978-81 1982-8t 1986-88 1978-81 1982-85 1986-88 1978-81 1982-85 1986-88 1978-81 1982-86 1986-88 Primary oxporters ?J 
Period
Notes: All data are unweighted period avorages. Sample of 83 countries with population exceeding 1 million in 1980. Classifications are described in appendix.
V' The rel exchange rate index is the ra ob (expressed in common currency units) of a weighted sum of trading partners' WPI indexes over the domestic CPI index 1980 = 80 (See appendix).
!/ Residual grouping (45 countries).
t Countries with a shar, of manufacturing exports in total exports > 30% or a share of manufacturing in GDP ) 13% (23 countries).
i/ Countries with a share of fuel exports in tota! exports > 60% (16 countries).
economic structure: fuel exporters, manufacturing exporters, and, as a residual category, non-fuel primary exporters. Period averag are taken for four macro-indicators: GDP growth, the share of investment in GDP, the real exchange rate, and two debt-burden indicators (the debt-to-GDP ratio and the debt-service ratio).
Three facts stand out. One is that only marufacturing exporters have resumed growth at pre-crisis levels (mostly the East Asian countries).
Although the debt-service burden of this grou-is high (partly because of a few Latin American countries in the grouping), it has stabilized.l/ Growth among the fuel exporters has deteriorated throughout the three periods.
Primary exporters have recuperated most of their loss in growth, but they have not arrested a declining trend in their external debt indicators.
The second significant fact is the ur.iversal, and pronounced, decline in the investment share in GDP. For the non-fuel groups, the share has fallen by about 202, while for fuel exporters the decline was even sharper, reaching 30?. To be sure, it can be argued that the overly ambitious investment programs following the oil boom needed to be scaled down. But the declines for the primary and manufacturing exporters are very high and may cause concern about the prospects for sustained recovery.
The finding of a declining investment share in GDP and a slowing down of the rate of growth in spite of a sharp deterioration in the real exchange rate is even more pronounced if we divide our sample of 83 countries into currently (i.e., in 1988) severely indebted countries and others. In doing so, we find that the 36 severely indebted countries had a decline in average growth from 3.1 percent in 1978-81 to 2.5 percent in 1986-88 while the average share of investment in GDP fell from 22.3 percent ln 1978-81 to 15.7 percent in 1986-88. For this severely indebted group of countries, the real exchange rate depreciation was 46 percent.
The third significant finding from Table 1 is the sharp real exchange rate depreciation. Six years into the crisis, the real exchange had depreciated by close to 40 percent, for all three country classifications. The sharp real exchange rate depreciation would have been required by any adjustment program involving an increase in the net transfer from debtor to creditor.
Otherwise the required shift towards tradable activities would not have materialized.
But there is more behind this sharp and universal depreciation in the real exchange rate. When the IMF and World Bank stepped in to fill at least some of the financing gap left by the withdrawal of commercial lending, they offered 'adjustment with growth" packages that relied heavily on a sharp depreciation of the real -xchange rate as a condition for obtaining funds. Of course, the real exchange rate is an endogenous variable that can never be fully under a country's policy control, but it is no exaggeration to say that achieving a sharp real exchange rate depreciation was the centerpiece of these adjustment packages. 2/
The failure of such a large number of countries to resume sustainable growth in spite of obvious efforts to adjust has given ammunition to the advocates of debt relief and to the critics of the adjustment with growth packages advocated by the IMF and the World Bank.
The heavy emphasis on real exchange rate depreciation as a way to restore external balance and elicit a significant supply response has been at the centre of this controversy about the effectiveness of these adjustment with growth packages. In the first part of the paper, we take a fresh look at the role of the exchange rate in the context of adjustment by introducing a crucial distinction between the short-run supply effect of a real exchange rate depreciation (often found to be positive) and its long-run effect on growth in oitput through its impact on investment.
In addition to the emphasis on a sharp depreciation of the real exchange rate, most adjustment packages introduced a host of productivity- The traditional structuralist argument against devaluation is that it has a small impact on the trade balance because of low elasticities.
This traditional argument has been buttressed by the contention that the redistributive mechanisms brought into play by devaluation (i.e., the shift from low savers to high savers) are contractionary from the demand side (Krugman and Taylor, 1977) . aditional stabilization packages reach the point of "overkill" (Diaz-Alejandro 1980 , Dell 1982 when it is further recognized that restrictive monetary policy may have a contractionary effect on supply through higher interest costs (Cavallo 1977 , Bruno 1979 ).
These shortcomings did not go unnoticed within the international agencies. But it was not until the advent of adjustment lending in the early eighties ($26 billion from the IMF and $16 billion from the World Bank during 1980-87) that these agencies made an explicit attempt to combine short-run stabilization goals with growth-oriented policies. In this new framework (see Corbo et al., 1987, and Thomas et al., 1990) , devaluation of the real exchange rate still played an essential role, not only to restore external balance but also to achieve a more efficient resource allocation. From the perspective of this new framework, the advocates of adjustment with growth believed that the positive supply response to a real devaluation would be sufficient to dominate its contractionary effects.
This new emphasis on growth did not diminish the criticism, however. A "new" structuralist critique pointed out that devaluation could be contractionary, this time from the supply side. The effect would come through the higher cost of imported inputs (Buffie 1984) , a lower volume of real credit (because of higher input prices with constant nominal credit) and consequently higher interest costs for firms (Van Wijnbergen 1986) , and, in the presence of widespread wage indexation, through higher labor costs. Finally, in the longer run, the negative effect on supply could be compounded if a real depreciation depressed investment because of a higher cost of imported capital equipm.ent (Buffie 1986 ).
As an example, consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculation of the contractionary effects of a devaluation that increases Assuming an economy-wide value-added ratio of 0.5, imported intermediates at 302 of total intermediates, and long-run demand and supply elasticities of 1 and 2 respectively, the contractionary effect would be 5Z of GDP. (In addition, the contractionary effects from the demand sile could conceivably lead to excess supply among non-traded sectors.) 3/ It should be understood that this "new" critique assumes that a nominal devaluation results in a real devaluation on impact --as has been the case in the eighties. The amount of the real devaluation will probably be less than the nominal devaluation, but it will be substantial, as the figures in Finally, a related critique from the advocates of debt relief is that the resulting overkill from the extreme severity of adjustment programs combined with a deteriorating external debt position has inhibited private investment. According to these critics, the debt overhang has acted as a tax on the proceeds of investment (Sachs, 1989) and uncertainty has created negative incentives for private investment (Rodrik 1989, and Dornbusch 1988) . As pointed out earlier, the criticism rests upon the consequences of uncertainty on the decision to invest in a world where the investment decision is at least partly irreversible. The argument here is that uncertainty about the future course of an adjustment package will lead potential investors to adopt a wait and see attitude even if crucial indicators for a decision to invest, like real wages, are favourable. In the typical Latin American case, flight capital will not be repatriated for investment because uncertainty about the outcome of the ongoing adjustment package is high.
External Adjustment and the Real Exchange Rate
We have seen that developing countries responded to the shocks of the 1980s by depreciating their real exchange rate. 4/ How effective has real exchange rate depreciation been? First we analyze the evolution of the trade balance to see how much of the improvement in the trade balance was accounted for by real exchange rate depreciation after controlling for time trends and country specific effects. Second, we look for evidence of supply response to the real exchange rate.
Start with the trade balance. For each one of the three country groupings in table 1, we pool countries and correlate the trade balanceto-GDP ratio with absorption, the real exchange rate, country dummies and a time trend. Unfortunately, because of lack of data, we are unable to sepa.ate out directly the effect of demand switching and supply response.
Results are reported in Table 2 . All coefficients for the real exchange rate are significant with the exception of that for fuel-exporters, which is not surprising since natural-resource-based economies usually have price-insensitive supply structures. Generally the lagged value of the real exchange rate is insignificant. The coefficient on absorption is even more significant. For our sample, then we conclude that the real exchange rate depreciation contributed to improving the trade balance.
We also reestimated the same equation adding dummy variables for the post-1981 period on the coefficients of A and RER. For the primaryexporter group a significantly negative value showed up for the real exchange rate dummy variable, suggesting no contribution of real exchange rate depreciation to trade balance improvements. 5/ This is consistent with other studies which have attempted to link the trade balance with the real exchange rate. 6/ Turn now to supply response. We assume that output supply at each point of time is a function of the capital stock, the cost of variable inputs, and possibly of lagged supply. Because of lack of data for our large sample, we approximate the cost of variable inputs by the real exchange rate. This variable is also intended to proxy the costs of labor and, more importantly, the presumed supply-augmenting effects of adjustment programs based on real exchange rate depreciation. As before, dummy variables capture country specific effects. The country-classification is unchanged. After taking a quasi first difference of the supply equation, one obtains the reduced form of table 3.
Interestingly, when it comes to the coefficient on the real exchange rate, one finds consistently a negative and significant contribution to supply (the lagged effects appear insignificant). It must, of course, be recognized that our simple reduced-form is certainly a shortcut way of trying to capture the supply-enhancing effects of a real depreciation. In terms of the framework developed earlier, the results in table 3, suggest that the presumed resource switching towards tradables The sharp fall in the share of investment in GDP in developing countries (Table 1) On the basis of these broad trends, one would be tempted to conclude that adjustment programs were largely successful, at least for manufacturing exporters. For this group, the fall in public and 
!i Ratios to GDP expressed in real terms.
h
IC(t) = IP(t)/(GDP(t)-(1-6) GDP(t-1)).
r = (i 6 -q) (q/p).
J See appendix for definition of country groupings.
J Data for US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada. Government bond yield taken as proxy for interest rate.
private sector investment was accompanied by an increase in the efficiency of total investment. It could also be argued that the reduction in the size of the public sector's capital expenditures weeded out the most inefficient investments and that the rationalization of public sector investments raised the marginal efficiency of public investment.
However, by emphasizing the need for a real exchange rate depreciation, adjustment programs compounded the increase in the cost of capital. It was hoped that the higher cost of capital would increase the efficiency use of capital. And, helped by financial sector reforms, distortions in factor prices favouring capital-intensive production techniques would be elimina'ed. In the final analysis, this means that the same growth rates can now be achieved with a smaller investment effort if the efficiency-augmenting effects are sufficiently strong.
These findings and interpretations are at best suggestive, but certainly not conclusive. The fall in the ICOR may reflect a higher rate of capacity utilization of a slowly increasing (or perhaps even shrinking) volume of capacity. It may also reflect a cutback of projects with long gestation lags (particularly public investment projects). In both cases the decline in the ICOR may not be sustainable and is likely to be reversed. Better information (like a breakdown of GDP into public and private sector components) would be needed for a sounder verdict. 8/ We can, however, go a bit further and verify whether the real exchange rate depreciation was a cause of the increase in the real cost of investment.
We can also verify whether the major cause of the decline in private investment was the increase in the cost of investment or other factors such as depressed demand.
We start with the cost of capital goods. Table 5 displays estimates of the elasticity of the relative price of capital goods in terms of the real exchange rate.
The results show that a real exchange rate devaluation significantly increases the relative price of investment. The effect is stronger for manufacturing exporters than for primary exporters.
At first sight this appears paradoxical. However, the result is less surprising when we consider that the share of construction in total investment is usually higher in lower-income countries (see Chenery, Syrquin, and Robinson 1986) . In sum, the results in tables 4 and 5 suggest that our data are at least consistent with the "new" structuralist critique, namely, that depreciation of the real exchange rate will have some contractionary effects on supply in the medium to long term. Of course, the undesirable effects of these contractionary pressures must be balanced against any efficiency-enhancing effects resulting from less distortion in the cost of capital.
We turn next to the causes of the decline in private investment.
A contributing factor must have been the income loss that resulted from the combination of worsening terms of trade and higher debt-service payments.
For the same group of countries as those in table 1, Faini et al. (1990) estimate a loss in income of 2.5 percent of the average GDP between 1978-81 and 1982-86 (period averages). To sort out further the effects on private investment of demand side shocks and of the cost of capital, we estimate a standard accelerator model in which the growth of absorption and the expected cost of capital are the main determinants of investment demand.
The simplicity of the accelerator model makes it attractive for separating degrees of freedom the effects on investment due to the combined effects of changes in the level of aggregate demand and changes in the expected cost of capital. We also examine whether the different components of the cost of capital (the real interest rate and the real price of investment goods) affect investment differently. 9/ Finally, we look for any significant impact on private investment of foreign exchange availability (measured as the sum of export receipts and non-monetary capital flows) and of public investment.
As expected, private investment is positively related to real GDP growth and negatively related to the cost of capital (table 6 ). The longrun elasticity of the investment rate with respect to the cost of capital is 0.16 for manufacturing exporters and .12 for primary exporters. Foreign axchange availability exerts a positive, but statistically weak, impact for primary exporters and no effect at all for manufacturing exporters. Public sector investment never proved to be statistically significant in any of the equations. Our data were unable to detect any significant complementarity (or substitutability) between public and private investment. This may be because our data did not distinguish between investment in infrastructure and investment by public enterprises.
It is instructive to apply the estimates in conclude that the output (and cther) effects were a more important contributing factor to the decline in investment than the substitution effect.
Investment and the Debt Overhang
While the accelerator model is useful for sorting out the contribution of demand shocks and of changes in the cost of capital, the calculations presented above suggest that other factors must have played an important role in explaining the recent dramatic decline in investment among developing countries. To explore these other factors, we now turn to a forward-looking approach to the investment decision. Clearly, entrepreneurs consider the future before committing long-term resources to production, basing their decision on their expectations about the future path of the main determinants of the investment's return.
In a context where investment is at least partially irreversible once capital is installed, the decision to invest is intrinsically tied to the level of uncertainty about the future evolution of the economy. A high level of uncertainty will reduce the propensity to invest of even riskneutral entrepreneurs insofar as it increases the possibility that highly productive capacity installed today will be of no use tomorrow if economic conditions deteriorate sharply. Under these circumstances, entrepreneurs would prefer to wait for the uncertainty to dissipate rather than make the decision to invest today. In turn, low investment today increases the probability of economic deterioration tomorrow, making the initial prophecy self-fulfilling (Rodrik 1989) . The economy becomes trapped in an inefficient, low-investment equilibrium.
This outcome is not simply a theoretical quibble. The scenario we have just sketched matches the situation in many developing countries, where the debt overhang and widespread symptoms of adjustment fatigue provide a gloomy outlook for the recovery of private investment. A recent World Bank report (1988) concludes that the long-run sustainability of the adjustment effort is threatened by low investment rates, persistent debt overhang, worsening income distribution, and burgeoning fiscal deficits. 10/ Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that forwardlooking entrepreneurs are quite reluctant to sink resources into nearly irreversible activities.
To model the forward-looking nature of the investment decision, we assume that the representative firm is constrained by a putty-clay technology and operates in an imperfectly competitive output market. (The model is derived in the appendix.) The hypothesis of a putty-clay technology means that production techniques are flexible ex ante but that once chosen, they cannot be changed in response to variations in factor prices. Capital market imperfections are summarized by an agency cost function in which a high leverage is associated with higher costs for the firm. Only debt and retained earnings are available as sources of investment finance. Finally, we dispense with the assumption that the interest rate and the entrepreneur's discount rate are identical. Market imperfections prevent such equalization. The risk premium (i.e., the difference between the discount rate and the interest rate) is assumed to be a function of the macroeconomic environment. The resulting first-order condition (see the appendix) relates the quasi-forward difference in the marginal capital-output ratio (multiplied by the ratio of the investment to the output deflators) to the determinants of the risk premium. ll/ This framework is convenient for investigating whether variables such as debt ratio, foreign exchange availability, the real exchange rate and public investment have a significant bearing on the investment decision through their impact on the macroeconomic environment. Estimation of the optimality condition helps isolate the effect of the macroeconomic environment on investment by controlling for the more direct impact that these variables have on investment through other channels such as the cost of capital.
Wc estimate this model for a smaller sample that combines manufacturing and primary exporters. 12/ Table 7 indicates several important results. First, an increase in the debt-export ratio is associated with a lower propensity to invest, possibly because of a higher risk premium. Second a depreciated real exchange rate and a greater availability of foreign exchange both promote investment. Finally, because the impact of the real exchange rate on total investment is not very significant and its inclusion in the equation worsens statistical performance, we aiso report an equation for total investment without the real exchange rate.
We also investigated whether the debt-export ratio became more significant during the crisis period.
Tests for in-sample stability show that the debt-export ratio has a significantly higher coefficient after 1982 (X 2 (2) = 7.5 and X 2 (2) = 20 for total and private investment).
The picture that emerges from these estimates is that the macroeconomic environment is likely to have had a significant impact on explains much of the cross-country differences in investment.
Looking Ahead
Six years into the crisis that hit developing countries, three facts stand out. First, only manufacturing exporters have resumed growth to pre-crisis levels and stabilized their debt-service burden. Second, the investment share in GDP has declined substantially. Third, the real exchange rate has depreciated sharply, by about 40 percent compared with its level around 1980. Arguably, a sharp real exchange rate depreciation was called for by the need to service higher interest payments. However, a substantial depreciation was also clearly at the heart of the adjustment with growth packages supported by the IMF and World Bank.
Complemented by microeconomic reforms for rationalizing incentives and by other measures aimed at mobilizing resources, depreciation of the real exchange rate was expected to help remove long-standing distortions in factor markets that favoured capital-intensive projects and distortions in goods markets that penalized the production of tradables, notably exports.
The evidence shows that for most countries, adjustment occurred mainly through a reduction in expenditures. To say the least, the econometric evidence is certainly consistent with structuralist arguments that real depreciation elicits little supply response in the short-run.
A sustainable recovery requires that income growth exceed population growth. For low income countries, population growth is around 2 percent a year. Per capita income growth was still negative during 1986-88
for fuel exporters and positive but less than half a percent for primary is not caused by a higher cost of capital.
The decline in real income caused by the unfavourable external environment also contributed to the decline in private investment.
However, the evidence also supports the contention that in a world where capital is at least partially irreversible once installed, uncertainty about the future course of the economy will lead investors to wait.
Econometric evidence from a forward-looking model of investment behavior shows that investment was negatively related to debt and foreign exchange availability indicators. Therefore, contrary to what has often been asserted, debt relief would raise investment rather than consumption.
Evidence was also found that investment was negatively affected by real exchange variability, a proxy for macroeconomic instability.
Two lessons emerge for the design of adjustment programs. In lowincome, primary-exporting countries the large real exchange rate devaluation that is central to the adjustment-with-growth strategy may not be effective for a number of reasons. These include the attendant rise in the cost of (mostly) imported capital inputs and the general lack of supply responsiveness to the real exchange rate depreciation. Second, the microeconomic reforms that have been at the heart of many recent adjustment packages may not bear fruit if there is uncertainty about the sustainability of the stabilization effort. Investors will wait for the uncertainty surrounding a stabilization program to be resolved, and low investment, in turn, will increase the probability of future economic deterioration. Under these circumstances, there is a high payoff for achieving macroeconomic stability by taking appropriate measures for partial debt relief and postponing microeconomic reforms if successful implementation is jeopardized by the uncertainty investors feel about the economy. At the same time, the use of funds available from debt relief should be monitored so as to improve the position of both the creditors and the debtors. As argued by Sachs (1989) and by Claessens and Diwan (1990) , debt relief should come with enhanced conditionality to provide the country with the incentive to adjust and, perhaps more crucially, to avoid the resumption of unsustainable macroeconomic policies. see Easterly and Wetzel (1989) .
9/
We also tested for a separate and/or different effect of the real exchange rate but found none.
10/ See V. Thomas et al. (1990) for a more complete appraisal of the sustainability of adjustment programs based on a case-by-case approach.
11/ The main shortcoming of this approach is that it assumes continuous optimization. Alternative approaches that stress the importance of financial variables on investment (e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988) , Dailami (1990) would require data that preclude their application to a large sample of countries.
12/ The sample is the same as that in tables 4-6 except that countries with negative ICORs have been eliminated.
13/ Alesina and Tabellini (1989) analyze the effects of macroeconomic instability in terms of political decisions.
This appendix describes the data used for the investment equations and the model used in the results reported in table 7.
The Investment Equations
Data. The data for the investment equations were collected from internal World Bank reports on individual countries. The sample was determined by the availability of a time series of about 10 years or more in which total gross investment was broken down into its private and public sector components. Often, investment in public sector enterprises was either unavailable separately or was included with private sector investment. Consistency of treatment was ensured within each country and, whenever possible, investment by public sector enterprises was included with public sector investment. Private investment was obtained as the difference between total gross domestic fixed investment and the collected public sector investment series. The resulting sample of 33 countries is described in table Al.
The Model. The representative firm is assumed to be constrained by a putty-clay technology and to operate in an imperfectly competitive output market. Imperfections in capital markets constrain the financing choice of the firm. There is no well-functioning stock market. There are, as a result, only two sources of finance: (short-term) debt and retained earnings. Entrepreneurs discount future returns at a rate, i, which is assumed to be larger than the risk-free interest rate, r (otherwise firms would accumulate financial assets). Therefore, debt is the privileged source of finance (perhaps also because of its favored tax status).
However, an internal solution to the optimal debt decision is obtained by assuming that higher outstanding debt relative to the firm's capital is associated with increasing agency costs.
The firm's problems can be written as: where XCt denotes the incremental capital-output ratio, ir is the real interest rate, [l+ir = (1+i)pt/pt+i] and e and a represent the price elasticity of demand and the capital elasticity of output, respectively.
The right-hand side of (A.7) is equal to MRt (1-A 2 ) after substituting from (A.5) and (A.6) and multiplying by a/pt. To interpret the left-hand side of eq. (AlO) notice that a large value of IC indicates a relatively more capital-intensive technique on the latest vintage which in turn must be attributed, for a given q, to a relatively high level of w, i.e. of the present discounted value of labour costs over the lifetime of machine. As a result the present value of marginal costs associated with a machine (i.e. the function g (.)) will be also large and lead, as indicated by eq.
(A7), to a lower capacity output. For a given value of 6, (AMO) can be estimated if we assume that izr. Suppose though that 1+i = (l+r) (l+p), where p is a multiplicative risk premium that depends on the macroeconomic environment. Multiply (AlO) by l+p and bring the unobservable terms from the left side to the right side of (Al). We then assume that p can be expressed as a function proxy of the state of the macroeconomic environment.
Equation (AlO) provides the basis for estimation. We apply (AlO)
to the panel described above. In estimating equation (AlO), we experiment over different values of 6. Notice that if p is not equal to zero, then the lagged value of q(IC/p) should belong on the right side of the equation. Fixed-effect estimation under these circumstances would be problematic, insofar as in dynamic panel data models the speed of convergence is a function of the number of observations per country. To circumvent this problem, we rely on a modified Anderson-Hsiao (1982) procedure. To eliminate the fixed effect, we take first differences of the original equation. By doing so, however, the error term, if it was white noise to begin with, is transformed into a first-order unit-root moving average process which is correlated with the first difference of q(IC/p).
Therefore, we use an (efficient) instrumental variable procedure by exploiting all the orthogonality restrictions between the error term and (q IC/p)t_i where i > 1. This generalized method of moment estimator was implemented in the DPD program developed by .
